

Prices received	
Percent increase 1956-57:	
January	3.5
February	3.0
March	3.0
December 1956 to February 1957	3.3
Prices paid	
Percent increase 1956-57:	
January	3.9
February	4.0
March	4.0
December 1956 to February 1957	3.7
Number of farms	
1952	5,860,000
1956	4,000,000
Decrease	460,000
Farm population	
1952	24,283,000
1956	22,257,000
Decrease	2,026,000
Farm population as percent of total population	
1952	15.5
1956	13.2
Foreclosure rate per 1,000 farms	
1952	1.6
1956	2.3
Farm employment (family workers and hired workers)	
1952	8,650,000
1956	7,875,000
Decrease	775,000

\* This is the highest yearly rate since 1944.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will comment, in passing, that 5,500 of those farms which have gone out of business are dairy farms in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Presiding Officer.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Presiding Officer.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, so long as we have mentioned dairy production, I should like to state that the net expenditures of the United States Government on price support activities for all dairy products from July 1949 to June 1953, was \$176.6 million, and from July 1953 to December 1956, was \$1,223.6 million. This is seven times the 1949-53 amount.

The present Secretary of Agriculture cannot blame high fixed price supports of Democratic administrations for these expenditures.

The Agricultural Act of 1949 authorized and directed the Secretary of Agriculture to support prices of milk and butterfat at such levels between 75 and 90 percent parity, as he deemed necessary to assure an adequate supply of milk.

Actual support levels as percent of parity are as follows:

Marketing year	Manufacturing milk, percent of parity	Butterfat, percent of parity
1952	80	90
1953	75	75
1954	75	75
1955	81	81
1956	81	81

In the 4 years since Mr. Benson has been Secretary of Agriculture, Government price support purchases of dairy products have been 29,045 million pounds—whole milk equivalent. In the previous 4 years the comparable amount was 6,568 million pounds.

Since 1953 the USDA has been operating under Mr. Benson's theory that lower price supports will reduce production. Yet total milk production has increased from a 1949-52 average of 115.5 billion pounds per year to the 1953-56 average of 123.2 billion pounds per year, an average yearly increase of 7.7 billion pounds.

Hourly returns to dairy farm operators and their families in the three major dairy areas show what Benson's program has accomplished.

The return per hour to operator and family labor—excluding returns to capital, are as follows:

1950	80.53
1951	78
1952	67
Average	75
1953	52
1954	44
1955	48
Average	48

Mr. President, I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Minnesota a question.

Senators continually point out to the Secretary of Agriculture, to the Senate, and to the people of the country, to the best of our ability, the facts, as opposed to the misstatements which are being continuously made by the Secretary of Agriculture. The figures presented by this administration show it to be a fact that the increase in wages, from 1952 to 1956, was 22 percent. The increase in corporate profits after taxes, from 1952 to 1956, was 33 percent. The increase in common-stock prices, from 1952 to 1956, was 77 percent. At the same time farm income decreased from 1952 to 1956, by 30 percent. Parity averaged 100 in 1952 and 83 in 1956. Last month parity again was 80. 1939 was the last year in which the yearly parity figure was this low. Under all those circumstances I ask the distinguished Senator what we can do to induce the Secretary of Agriculture to tell the facts to the American people and to stop making these misstatements.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I must reply to my esteemed and good friend from Missouri that the only thing we can do is to have men like the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] tell the facts, because the Secretary of Agriculture is just not going to do it. We have tried repeatedly in the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry to obtain these facts. We have had to dig them out. This is no exaggeration. It is unfortunately a sad truth. I wish to thank the Senator from Missouri. I know the Senator has had an exceedingly busy day. I know this problem of agriculture is close to his heart. I have visited his State a few many of the farm people of this State. I am of the

the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, as well as other committees.

#### AUTHORIZATION FOR RECEIPT OF MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to receive messages from the House of Representatives while the Senate is in adjournment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### SOVIET AIRPOWER

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, recently, the public has been confused by published reports that our intelligence estimates had been revised and that we had been overestimating Soviet airpower strength.

These reports were based upon a downward revision of the estimates of Soviet production of one category of their heavy bombers, that is, the Blson. In no other estimate were there downward revisions, and in this one case the estimate was that of a temporary decrease in production due to some technical production difficulty—such as we have experienced in our own B-52 output.

In all other instances our intelligence history has been that of underestimating the quantity, quality, and timing of Soviet production of weapons and weapons systems.

At this point, Mr. President, I should like to have printed in the RECORD an informative letter from Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, on this matter.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

##### OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR.

Washington, D. C., March 18, 1957

The Honorable STUART SYMINGTON,  
United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR SYMINGTON: Yesterday, in your telephone call, you asked me for a memorandum with respect to the change in the national intelligence estimate on Soviet heavy-bomber strength which differed from that given in the testimony before your subcommittee last April. You also called my attention to certain newspaper publicity which appeared recently with respect to this matter.

The facts are as follows:

The intelligence community is continually reviewing its current and projected estimates of Soviet strengths against the best evidence obtainable. Production difficulties, modifications of design, change in emphasis, and other factors mean that actual production here, in the U. S. S. R. and, in fact, anywhere, does not necessarily coincide with predictions.

The estimate of Soviet heavy bomber strength as of April 1, 1956, which was given in my testimony before your subcommittee, was based largely on an estimate of production rate which rested upon earlier evidence.

Subsequent to my testimony, your subcommittee in April 1956, the estimate was revised to reflect the